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The legal profession adheres to a story of a unified profession. Never-
theless, the profession has distinct professional sub-groups which repeatedly 
represent clients with interests adverse to those represented by attorneys who 
identify with other sub-groups. The idea of "professional identity as advo-
cacy" describes how such professional sub-groups accuse opposing sub-
groups of greed, self-aggrandizement, or worse. This is most notable in two 
areas: personal injury litigation and criminal cases. This process has two 
seemingly contradictory consequences. First, it renders narrow areas ex-
traordinarily visible, thus defining popular discourse and conceptions about 
lawyers and law. Second, it masks vast areas of litigation and law that have a 
fundamental impact on social justice yet do not generate the "profile" trig-
gered where professional identity as advocacy is at its most intense. This 
Article explores the nature and consequences of professional identity as ad-
vocacy and examines the degree to which this dynamic can or should change. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal profession adheres to a story of a single, unified profession. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct, with only minor exceptions, apply to all 
lawyers, whatever type of law they practice. 1 Qualifications to obtain ad-
mission to the bar-graduation from law school, character and fitness re-
view, the bar exam itself-similarly operate under the assumption that 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 20-25. 
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lawyers follow identical norms however divergent the type of law they ulti-
mately pursue.2 
Groups of lawyers, however, have distinct professional sub-identities 
that distinguish them from other segments of the profession, particularly 
when the two segments repeatedly represent clients with adverse interests. 
This is most notable in the two areas that most capture popular and politi-
cal attention: personal injury litigation and criminal justice. Popular cul-
ture defines these areas as what the practice of law is.3 It is precisely in 
these areas that a process I call "professional identity as advocacy" is most 
strident and fundamental. This process entails one group of practitioners 
advocating on behalf of themselves as an "in group" against an "out 
group," while another group of practitioners view the situation in reverse: 
they view themselves as the "in group" and the prior "in group" as the "out 
group." The crux of the professional identity concept is that these distinct 
professional groups oppose one another over and over again, and, as a re-
sult, each accuses the other of greed, self-aggrandizement, or worse. As 
articulated in this discourse, the stakes of who "wins" this battle are ex-
traordinary: each side carries the banner of the public good-all the public 
good. The result evokes classic narratives of good versus evil. Such narra-
tives not only embody archetypes of good and evil, but also the monumen-
tal consequences that hinge on the battle's outcome: the fate of the world, 
sometimes quite literally, hangs in the balance, dependent on whether the 
"good guys" defeat the "bad guYS."4 
A striking dimension of professional advocacy as identity is that it sur-
faces only in these relatively limited areas of practice. Other hugely impor-
tant segments of the profession operate almost completely under the radar 
screen. One example is commercial litigation, which ordinarily entails 
highly resourced clients who almost always employ large law firms. As a 
rule, large law firms have professional identity only insofar as they re-
present large organizations. There is no moral or political spin to their 
client list: in most instances a large organization opposes another large or-
ganization.s It is not the "people" against a "criminal": it is not "the little 
guy" against the "bad guy." 
Another example of "under the radar screen" litigation is the extraor-
dinarily large number of litigants who litigate in "mass justice" courtS.6 
There is indeed professional identity as advocacy in this arena, with a corps 
of lawyers representing, in most cases, more heavily resourced parties-
creditors, landlords, the government-against a tiny corps of lawyers who 
provide free legal services to low-income litigants, albeit a small percentage 
of them. The irony here, though, is that there are so few lawyers with so 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34. 
3. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69. 
4. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 83-84 (2000) (quot-
ing ELAINE PAGELS, THE ORIGIN OF SATAN 105 (1995) (referring to stories embodying cultural norms 
which "draw the battle lines between 'the sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness' "». 
5. See infra text accompanying note 168. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 142-52. 
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few resources engaged in this arena that the "battle," to a large extent, 
remains invisible. A further irony is that this invisibility masks the massive 
social costs and tragic consequences underlying this type of litigation. Put 
another way, here is an area where a little professional identity as advocacy 
might not be such a bad thing, but a key ingredient to get the stories told to 
a wider audience-resources-does not exist. 
All of these dynamics have multiple consequences. It contributes to 
the low regard in which the profession is held because stories of profes-
sional gain at the expense of the public good tend to tarnish all lawyers. 
The entrenched battle lines and demonization of the "other" inhibit profes-
sional collaboration outside individual client representation. Such collabo-
ration might enhance the administration of justice and legal reform in both 
civil and criminal law. It also obscures the deplorable state of access to 
justice. 
This Article explores these issues in five parts. The first part traces the 
history of specialization within the legal profession. The second part ex-
plores the cognitive and social basis for professional advocacy-the crea-
tion of "in groups" and "out groups." The third part describes the two 
primary examples of professional advocacy that capture the attention of 
the public: personal injury litigation and criminal justice. The fourth part 
tackles two areas that, for very different reasons, are not subject to public 
scrutiny: commercial litigation involving large business enterprises and in-
dividual representation in courts of mass justice. The final part explores 
the consequences of professional identity as advocacy on the profession 
and society more generally.7 
II. OVERVIEW: THE UNITARY PROFESSION 
A first step in examining professional identity as advocacy is to trace 
the arc of attorneys' identity over time. Virtually every discussion that ex-
coriates the current state of the professionS recalls a misty past where the 
7. I will not address two trends in the legal profession that have been covered in detail else-
where. One is the socioeconomic, racial, and gender trends within the profession. See RICHARD L. 
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 85, 109 (1989). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERI. 
CAN LAW 488-90 (3d ed. 2005). Another is the decline of "professionalism." There are innumerable 
bar journal articles on the subject of a growing number of "civility codes" that seek to reign in the 
"Rambo tactics" of litigators. For some academic treatments of the subject, see Christopher J. Piaz-
zaola, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civil-
ity Rule, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1197 (2003); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. 
L. REV. 1 (1993). For an overview of cases involving uncivil lawyers, see Josh O'Ohara, Creating Civil-
ity: Using Reference Group Theory to Improve Inter-Lawyer Relations, 31 VT. L. REV. 965, 966-67 
(2007). In contrast, for a critique of the "civility" debate as reflecting powerful interests within the bar 
itself, see Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994). These themes are of great importance and I will refer to them at times, but 
my purpose here is to address professional segmentation that generates political and moral differentia-
tion between categories of clients and the lawyers that represent them. 
8. Consider the following statement of Carl T. Bogus: "The legal profession is dead or dying. It 
is rotting away into an occupation. On this, those assembled at the bedside concur .... " Carl T. Bogus, 
The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 911 (1996). 
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profession truly was a "profession" characterized by integrity and profes-
sional service offered to all comers.9 This section will examine this idea as 
well as the notion that all lawyers are part of a common enterprise charac-
terized by unity of goal and identity. 
A. The Rhetoric of Attorney "Independence": Two 
Historical Antecedents 
A classic conception of what being a lawyer is involves decoupling cli-
ents' cases from the advocate.lO Such decoupling creates a peculiar rela-
tionship: passionate advocacy on behalf of someone (or, in the case of 
businesses, something) with the advocacy distinct from an attorney's per-
sonal beliefs. I will trace two historical examples that illustrate this para-
digm of "independent" advocacy. 
1. John Adams and the Boston Massacre 
John Adams represented British soldiers accused of murder in the 
Boston Massacre. This relatively unknown factl1-perhaps inconsistent 
with the prevailing narrative of "patriots" against "loyalists" -demon-
strates that in Adams' time the virtues of representing the despised-even 
those whom the attorney might otherwise despise-was alive and well. 
Consider the following entry from Adams' Diary from 1773, where he re-
flects on his role in the Boston Massacre trial which had occurred three 
years earlier: 
I ... devoted myself to endless labor and Anxiety if not to infamy and 
death, and that for nothing, except, what indeed was and ought to be in all, 
sense of duty ... [I] incurr[ed] a Clamour and hazarding popular Suspi-
cions and prejudices which are not yet worn out and never will be forgot-
ten ... It was, however, one of the most gallant, generous, manly, and 
disinterested Actions of my whole life, and one of the best Pieces of Ser-
vice I ever rendered my Country."12 
It is worth noting that Adams sees his act as "disinterested." He is not 
his client and assumes the independent stance of advocate at a time when 
popular passions regarding the preeminent political issue of his day were at 
their zenith.13 
9. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. 
REV. 549 (1996). 
10. Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.c. L. REV. 1003, 1007 
(1994). 
11. There has, however, been a recent discussion of Adams' defense of British soldiers in the 
Boston Massacre in the ABA's "Law Day" held in 2011. Ed Finkel, John Adams Gets His Day, 97 
AB.A J. 56 (2011). 
12. 3 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 79 (L.H. Butterfield, ed.) 
(1962). 
13. Adams' defense is viewed as successful. Of his eight clients, six were acquitted and, although 
two were found guilty, Adams succeeded in having their sentence reduced from death to branding. The 
preeminent history of the Boston Massacre and the resulting trial and its aftermath is HILLER B. 
ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE (1970). 
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2. Abraham Lincoln and the Country Lawyer 
Abraham Lincoln, given his fame, serves well as a figure representing 
so much of what the profession is currently not. While there is every rea-
son to believe that Lincoln's contemporaries were generalists as he was, 
there is no lawyer of his time who has been even remotely researched as 
exhaustively as Lincoln. He can thus serve as a typical if (of course) ex-
traordinarily notable lawyer of his time. 
While Lincoln's general philosophy of practice is often encapsulated in 
frequently repeated quotes,14 the cases he undertook neatly encapsulate 
the paradigm of the non-specialist. 15 He handled numerous debtor-credi-
tor matters, representing both the debtors and the creditors. He repre-
sented railroad corporations-an enormously powerful business interest in 
Lincoln's time-as well as individuals litigating against railroad corpora-
tions. He represented both in-state and out-of-state litigants in diversity 
cases.16 While not an elected prosecutor, he assisted in prosecution by 
drafting indictments, acting as co-counsel, and serving directly as a state's 
attorney pro tem. I7 At the same time Lincoln had an active criminal de-
fense practice.I8 He also practiced in what we would now call "transac-
tional" work-real estate matters, trusts and estates, general legal advice to 
individuals and businesses, and even patents.19 
This caseload is notable for several reasons. The first is its breadth: 
criminal law, debtor creditor, transactional practice, and commerciallitiga-
tion-these embody knowledge of disparate substantive areas of the law 
14. Perhaps his most famous is cited as a precursor to the mediation movement and conceptions 
of more collaborative, problem· solving lawyering: "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to 
compromise whenever you can. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has superior opportunity of being a good 
man. There will be business enough." THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 15 
(Philip Van Doren Stern ed., 1961). 
15. John A. Lupton, THE LAW PRA=ICE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A NARRATIVE OVERVIEW, 
http://www.papersofabrahamlincoln.orglnarrative_overview.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). See also 
Ariens, supra note 10, at 1029 (Lincoln "practiced law in the traditional manner, representing clients in 
all kinds of legal matters, and representing any clients who came to him"; "[h]e refused to let the 
passions of the community determine the vigor of his defense of one who was criminally accused, and 
he remained an independent lawyer who knew the whole field of law"). For a searchable database of 
documents from cases in which Lincoln was involved, visit http://www.lawpracticeofabrahamlincoln.orgl 
Search.aspx. 
16. This opposing representation is all the more remarkable because railroads succeeded in 
transforming common law regarding who bears liability for property damages. Businesses, especially 
railroads, feared the financial consequences of judgments awarded to plaintiffs. Consider the result: 
"At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the law of nuisance provided an almost exclusive remedy 
for indirect interferences with property rights, and courts were prepared to award damages for injury to 
property regardless of social utility or absence of carelessness. By the time of the Civil War, by con-
trast, American courts had created a variety of legal doctrines whose primary effect was to force those 
injured by economic activities to bear the cost of these improvements." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 70-71 (1977); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 38-39 (1991) (tracing the development of the "public 
use doctrine" to favor governmental subsidies to railroads). 
17. Lupton, supra note 15. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
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that few modern practitioners could claim to possess. What is more impor-
tant for purposes of this Article is how Lincoln smoothly moved from one 
"side" to another, representing criminal defendants to acting as prosecutor, 
representing large organizational entities to litigating against those entities. 
Here is Lincoln, like Adams before him, acting as the "disinterested" coun-
selor who remains, as counselor, independent from those clients' interests. 
B. The Current Ideal of Generalism and Attorney Independence 
Although widely critiqued, the rhetorical norms of the profession re-
main staunchly Lincolnesque. 
First, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct largely remain rules of 
general application, guiding all types of practice. While on very rare occa-
sions some allowances are made for distinctive qualities of certain types of 
practice, particularly criminallaw,20 there is only a single rule out of 59 that 
explicitly does so: Rule 3.8-"Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.'l21 
While lawyers "may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not 
practice in particular fields of law," there remains a strong policy against 
taking this too far: in only rare cases can a "lawyer state or imply that a 
lawyer is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law.,,22 There has 
been a relatively modest call for specialized sets of ethical requirements 
that more closely reflect the different worlds in which lawyers practice.23 
Nevertheless, apart from binding codes regulating conduct before govern-
ment agencies,24 these calls have led to little meaningful action by entities 
that regulate lawyers. 
The ethical rules further embody the longstanding norm of decoupling 
the substance of representation from the content of representation. Under 
the heading "Independence from Client's Views or Activities," the Model 
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 3.1 (2008) (making special allowances that a lawyer 
for a criminal defendant may require that every element of the case be established); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDuer R. 3.3(a)(3) (making special rules for reasonable belief about false testimony by a 
criminal defendant). In both of these instances, constitutional rights for a criminal defendant explicitly 
trump rules that otherwise apply in other contexts. 
21. Arguably two other Rules address special roles an attorney might undertake: Rule 2.4 
("Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral") and Rule 3.9 ("Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceed-
ings"). These examples, however, do not specify a special type of client-an important point given the 
issues this Article seeks to address. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 7.4. Interestingly, while such "certified specializa-
tions" are available to attorneys, only 3% of attorneys are so certified as compared to 80-90% of physi-
cians. Thomas P. Sartwelle, Your Doctor is Board Certified. Is Your Lawyer?, 20 PROF'L L. 1 (2011). 
One reason Sartwelle identifies for these figures is the notion that "formal specialization detracts from 
a presumption that any licensed lawyer is competent to handle any legal problem." Id. at 20. Perhaps 
this represents the continuing influence of the Lincolnesque paradigm. 
23. For general calls in favor of such specialized codes, see Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Sepa-
rate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); 
Fred Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 190 (1997) (collecting 
citations to "specialized codes of conduct covering lawyers engaged in particular areas of practice"). 
24. The most prominent recent example of agency regulation of attorneys is the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which, in the wake of the Enron scandal, called on the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
pass a set of "minimum standard of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before 
the Commission." 15 U.S.c. § 7245 (2006). The SEC subsequently did so. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2010). 
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Rules state that "legal representation should not be denied to people ... 
whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval" and 
"representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or 
activities."25 John Adams would wholeheartedly approve. 
Interestingly, the disjunction between the realities of practice and the 
strict generalism of the Model Rules appears to be on the rise. Non-bind-
ing ethical codes and articles that do focus on distinct areas of practice are 
proliferating. Examples include family law,26 admiralty,27 and trusts and 
estates.28 Professional identity is well illustrated here: the depth of profes-
sional identity in situ virtually has compelled these practitioners to craft 
their own guidelines because the ethical rules guiding a unitary "profes-
sions" do not. 
Another classic demonstration of the generalist paradigm is the law 
school curriculum, which is virtually unchanged since the time of Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell in the nineteenth century.29 The classic roster of 
first year classes-Civil Procedure, Property, Torts, Criminal Law, and 
Constitutional Law-is not about teaching the practice of criminal law or 
the practice of civil litigation. Rather, the endlessly repeated declaration of 
what legal education is about-"thinking like a lawyer"-has as its thrust 
the idea that "thinking like a lawyer" is consistent across practice areas?O 
Moreover, the ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools remains 
generalist in outlook?1 and even recent critiques of legal education view 
"professional identity" in general ethical, social, and moral terms, none of 
which are keyed to particular areas of practice.32 
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. [5]. In somewhat contradictory fashion, the 
Rules also note that a lawyer should "accept appointments" to represent clients "except for good 
cause," one of which is "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the 
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 6.2(c). 
26. See AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (2000); see also Model 
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation (2001). 
27. William W. Wright, Jr., Admiralty Law Institute Symposium: The Uniqueness of Admiralty 
and Maritime Law: Ethical Considerations in Representing Multiple Parties in Litigation, 79 TuL. L. 
REV. 1523 (2005). 
28. See AM. COLL. OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993). 
29. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHooe LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850's TO 
THE 1980's 52-53 (1983). 
30. Indeed, legal education has traditionally eschewed "practice"-let alone specialized practice 
areas-as worthy of much attention. Christopher Columbus Langdell offers a pure form of this idea: to 
improve legal education it is "indispensable to establish at least two things: first, that the law was a 
science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." Chris-
topher C. Langdell, Address at the Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of the Founding of 
Harvard College (Nov. 5, 1886), in A RECORD OF THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO 
EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE Two HUNDRED AND FIfTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD 
COLLEGE 85 (1887). 
31. ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ApPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 302 (2010-
2011) (requiring instruction in "substantive law" and "other professional skills" which are "generally 
regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession"). 
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO. 
FESSION OF LAW 126-61 (2007). This influential study-usually referred to as the "Carnegie Report"-
focuses on improving legal education in general terms, not to improve legal education in terms of 
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Finally, the Bar Exam, since its rise in the 1920's, is a reflection of the 
pure generalism characteristic of the Model Rules and legal education. 
The subjects tested are the familiar ones long required in law schools.33 
While the bar examination has come under intense scrutiny,34 testing su-
perficial familiarity with standard law school fare is what the bar examina-
tion continues to try to do. Unlike board certifications in medicine, a 
barred lawyer can thus do anything without additional qualifications and 
without demonstrating expertise through further assessments. A superfi-
cial test of general knowledge thus remains the core qualification for ad-
mission to the bar despite the increasing specialization of the legal 
profession. 
III. PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY DEFINED 
In contrast to the generalist paradigm, the profession has become in-
creasingly specialized,35 decoupled from the steadfast generalism of profes-
sional regulation, legal education, and the licensing process. While some 
decry this trend, often building upon the generalist paradigm and recalling 
the image of Lincoln, most practicing lawyers view specialization as neces-
sary to earn a living in the market for legal services.36 
Be that as it may, specialization has had another consequence: the cre-
ation of warring camps, groups of lawyers who exclusively represent one 
side within a specialty. This is professional identity as advocacy. This Arti-
cle will now trace an early, perceptive articulation of the idea, and then 
explore how professional identity as advocacy has become a potent aspect 
of today's legal landscape. 
promoting substantive specialization. See also Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRAGnCES FOR LEGAL ED-
UCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 73 (2007) (describing "core knowledge of the law" as embody-
ing conventional first year classes). 
33. The Multistate Bar Examination tests contracts, torts, constitutional law, criminal law and 
procedure, evidence, and real property. THE MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION, http://www_ncbex.org/ 
multistate-tests/mbel (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
34. Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifica-
tions for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191 (1995). 
35. For an exhaustive history and overview of specialization, see Ariens, supra note 10, at 1043. 
36. The influential ABA report on legal education, usually called the "MacCrate Report," dis-
cusses how "changing law and new complexities have put an increasing premium on specialization to 
maintain competence and keep abreast of subject matter." TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHS. AND THE PRO-
FESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCA-
TIONAL CONTINUUM 42 (1992). Some argue that the trend is a positive development because it lowers 
the cost of legal services and helps insure greater competence. See Ariens, supra note 10, at 1051-57. 
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A. Llewellyn's Crucial Insight: "Specialization Breeds 
Counter-Specialization" 
Karl Llewellyn was and remains an influential figure in jurisprudence 
and legal education.37 Among his many works, he wrote a remarkable arti-
cle entitled "The Bar Specializes: With What Results?"38 in 1933-almost 
precisely the midway point between Lincoln's time and ours. In it Llewel-
lyn notes that the Bar has become increasingly specialized39 and the new 
specialization is in contrast to what Llewellyn calls the "tolerable rounded-
ness" of the "old-fashioned American lawyer."4o Llewellyn offers a crucial 
insight that goes deeper than these more conventional observations: "spe-
cialization breeds counter-specialization. "41 
In three words Llewellyn articulates how specialists are not merely dis-
crete, independent islands of expertise. Rather, one area of specialization 
triggers an opposing specialization. There is, thus, not only an over arching 
specialization in "personal injury." Rather, there is specialization on be-
half of personal injury plaintiffs and a "counter-specialization" on behalf of 
personal injury defendants. This is far deeper than decrying specialization 
as a general matter in contrast to the generalist idea1.42 It means that spe-
cialization is a process that recalls Newton's Third Law of Motion: for 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. 
B. Llewellyn's Insight Extended: Good Versus Evil 
Llewellyn's "counter-specialization" idea generates an important re-
sult: the opposition he identifies is one of good against evil. One group of 
specialist-practitioners will argue that its opponents are not motivated by 
the public good or by the norms of professionalism and integrity, but by 
pecuniary interests, self-aggrandizement, or some general sense of self-in-
terest and "badness."43 Put another way, professional identity becomes 
merged into "the interests of particular classes of clients" who are good 
against another particular class of clients who are bad.44 
37. Llewellyn was a chief exponent of the important movement called "Legal Realism." AMERI. 
CAN LEGAL REALISM 49 (William M. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). His work is still frequently reprinted. 
One of his books-THE BRAMBLE BusH-has been called "one of the most popular introductions to 
the law and its study in the United States." Steve Sheppard, Introduction to KARL LLWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH, at ix (Steve Sheppard ed. 2008). 
38. Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Results?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. 
SCI. 177 (1933). 
39. ld. 
40. ld. at 182. 
41. ld. at 183 (emphasis added). 
42. It is worth noting that, as with many evocations of the "good old days," the old days might 
not have been so good, or at least so different, as current days. See Galanter, supra note 9, at 549 
(arguing that a Golden Age argument "emerges not from independent examination of the past but 
from the polemical thrust of a critique of the present"). 
43. I will explore the mechanisms of how this operates in much more detail in the areas of per-
sonal injury and criminal law. See infra text accompanying notes 66-141. 
44. Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Pro-
fession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 870 (1997). 
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Social scientists offer an explanation about why this process gets un-
derway and becomes so intractable and enduring. Humans self-identify 
with distinct groups which, by definition, are different from other groupS.4S 
Group identification can be across a dizzying number of categories even 
apart from perhaps the most prominent distinctions based on race, gender, 
religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. It can, for example, be based on 
socioeconomics, geography (whether by continent, country, region, county, 
city, neighborhood, block), politics, sports, employment, self-presentation 
(clothing, grooming), level of education, age, and many more. Some of 
these categories might be a core element of group-identity, or can become 
prominent in certain places and times.46 Moreover, these self-identified 
groups have a cognitive basis and are deeply rooted in our psyches47 and, 
once formed, are notoriously difficult to eradicate. They become part of 
the cognitive "map" through which we make sense of the world.48 
Integral to these group identities is the idea that one group-almost 
always one's in-group-is "good" while the out-group is "bad."49 Groups 
distinguish and diminish opposing groups-what Cass Sunstein has called 
"group polarization. "50 Yankee fans "hate" the Red Sox and vice versa, 
45. For a recent and fascinating study of how quickly and seamlessly humans form into "tribes" 
even based on arbitrary criteria, see Daniel L. Shapiro, Relational Identity Theory: A Systematic Ap-
proach for Transforming the Emotional Dimension of Conflict, 65 AMER. PSYCH. 634 (2010). In Sha-
piro's experiment, a group of participants were randomly selected to sit at different tables. An alien 
then entered the room who said the world would be destroyed unless the "tribes" chose "one tribe as 
the the tribe for anyone." Id. Despite the obvious interest for all concerned in reaching consensus on 
this representative tribe, the ensuing discussion descended into anger and recrimination. The tribes 
could reach no agreement." Id. at 634-35. 
46. The notion of multiple identifications, or what is sometimes called "intersectionality," tends 
to be submerged and simplified in discourse that emphasizes one-group identification. Consider Stan-
ley Fish's amusingly detailed list of groups to which he belongs: "1 am, among other things, white, male, 
a teacher, a literary critic, a student of interpretation, a member of a law faculty, a father, a son, a 
husband (tWice), a citizen, a (passionate) consumer, a member of the middle class, a Jew, the oldest of 
four children, a cousin, a brother-in-law, a son-in-law, a Democrat, short, balding, fifty, an easterner 
who has been a westerner and is now a southerner, a voter, a neighbor, an optimist, a department 
chairman." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 30 (1989). See also Wayne C. Booth, 
Introduction to Mikhail Bakhtin, in PROBLEMS WITH DOSTOYEVSKY'S POETICS (Caryl Emerson ed. & 
trans. 1984), at xxi (describing Bakthin's idea about how meaning is constructed around the "immense 
pluralities of experience" based on, among other things, "parent, clan, class, religion, country"). 
47. Charles Stangor & James E. Lange, Mental Representations of Social Groups: Advances in 
Understanding Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
357 (1994); c. Neil Macrae et aI., Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive 
Toolbox, 66 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 37-38 (1994). 
48. See Macrae, supra note 47 ("for reasons of cognitive economy, we categorize others as mem-
bers of particular groups-groups about which we often have a great deal of generalized. or stereo typic. 
knowledge") (quoting S.T. Fiske & S.L. Neubert, A Continuum Model of Impression formation from 
Category-Based To Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and 
Interpretation, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15 (M.P. Zanna, ed. 1990). 
49. Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,74,91 
(2000) (describing group polarization in light of "the introduction of a rival 'outgroup' "). For a similar 
description in the context of cognitive science, see ZOLTAN KOVESCES, LANGUAGE, MIND, AND CUL-
TURE 109-10 (2006) ("prejudices come in the form of structured opposites that correspond to relative 
in-groups and out-groups"). 
50. Sunstein, supra note 49. at 74. Although in the context of discussing deliberative democracy, 
Sunstein offers a rich discussion of the psychological and sociological processes that lead group mem-
bers to adopt increasingly extreme views. 
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and hate must be based on something, and that something must be good 
against evil.51 The residents of that neighborhood are unsophisticated 
(bad), while this neighborhood's residents are caring and look out for each 
other (good). "Seniors" might decry "kids these days" as lazy or impudent 
or spoiled, while those "kids" might view "seniors" as out of touch, cranky, 
or narrow. The French think Americans are unrefined and boorish while 
Americans think the French are snobbish and unfriendly. There are deeply 
held norms of a binary universe at play here: they "draw[ ] battle lines be-
tween the 'sons of light' and the 'sons of darkness.' "52 
So how does this process play out in terms of the legal profession? 
C. The Lawyer as Moral Crusader and Charlatan 
Good lawyers fight for the people. Stories of lawyerly courage in the 
face of oppression and injustice run deep. They are, preeminently, in the 
realm of the civil rights movement. The importance of these events in trac-
ing positive lawyer identity cannot be overstated. There remain powerful 
images of the fight for Civil Rights;53 the ringing rejection of "separate but 
equal" in Brown v. Board of Education;54 the image of Atticus Finch in the 
film55 and book56 To Kill a Mockingbird. As noted earlier, there is the 
compelling image of "honest Abe Lincoln" displaying unwavering integ-
rity.57 The popularity of shows involving lawyers-particularly in criminal 
law-continues unabated,58 and, in these instances, as one commentator 
has put it, lawyers "are shown as triumphing through law."59 These images 
together represent the professional ideal in word and deed, struggling, and 
ultimately succeeding, in doing the "right thing." 
51. The sports analogy is a telling one. Research suggests how even the somewhat arbitrary 
nature of sports associations breeds enormous in- and out-group feeling to such an extent that 
"[w]hoever you root for represents you." James C. McKinley, Sports Psychology: It Isn't lust a Game: 
Clues to Avid Rooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,2000. Like the Shapiro experiment, supra note 45, there is 
also the notion that rooting for sports teams relates "to a primitive time when human beings lived in 
small tribes, and warriors fighting to protect tribes were true genetic representatives of their people." 
[d. 
52. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 4, at 83-84 (quoting ELAINE PAGELS, THE ORIGINS OF 
SATAN 105 (1995». 
53. Perhaps the best-known volume tracing the history of the Civil Rights movement is TAYLOR 
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KIND YEARS 1954-1963 (1988). 
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
55. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962). 
56. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19. 
58. The most prominent is the Law & Order franchise, which has spawned numerous spinoffs 
and has been on the air for 20 years as of the date of this writing. Law & Order (Universal Media 
Studios). Another famous example is Perry Mason, which was popular both as a television show and in 
numerous television movie spinoffs. Perry Mason (CBS Television Network). 
59. Marc Galanter, Changing Legal Consciousness in America: The View from the loke Corpus, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2238 (2002) (citing films where "Justice is Done!" and where "lawyers 
succeed in vindicating the right"). 
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In contrast, images of "bad lawyers" abound. Lawyer jokes are ac-
ceptable and pervasive, and have generated scholarly attention60 and anal-
ysis.61 Among the identified categories of lawyer jokes: "the lawyer as 
predator," "lawyers as a destructive force," and "lawyers as laboratory 
rats."62 Numerous images of unscrupulous, greedy and/or self-aggrandiz-
ing lawyers remain embedded in modern popular media.63 
Professional advocacy as identity draws upon contradictory images of 
lawyers and appropriates the positive image for the "in group" while accus-
ing the "out group" of embodying negative stereotypes. A key to success 
in this effort is to collapse the "good stereotype" into something that is 
viewed not as stereotype at all, but as "reality."64 Stereotypes become real, 
and, so a group would argue, the group is "really" like the good stereotype 
while the out-group is "really" the bad stereotype. There is moral condem-
nation at the foundation of this discourse.65 
IV. PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY IN Two CONTEXTS 
Professional identity as advocacy plays out in different areas of law. 
My first two examples-personal injury and criminal law-are perhaps the 
most prominent instances of this dynamic today.66 In both instances my 
goal is not to assess who is right and who is wrong. It is, rather to describe 
the rhetorical and narrative strategies through which professional advocacy 
is undertaken.67 
A. The Personal Injury Wars 
Plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury litigation are in economic 
equipoise, albeit perhaps not in an obvious way. The ultimate sources of 
60. Marc Galanter has written an entire volume assessing and analyzing the impact of lawyer 
jokes. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005). For a 
summary of Galanter's findings and ideas, see Galanter, supra note 59. 
61. For a website that collects and categorizes lawyer jokes, see Peter Tiersman, Lawyer lokes: 
Truth and Nonsense about the Legal Profession, LAWYER JOKES, http://www.languageandlaw.orgl 
JOKES.HTM (last visited Apr 7, 2012). 
62. Galanter, supra note 59, at 2228, 2230, 2234. 
63. See infra text accompanying notes 89-116. 
64. Successful work in this regard is very much like success in advocacy more generally. See 
Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FURTHER ESSAYS ON INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 173 (1983) (noting that successful advocacy 
entails a "matching process" between what is said and what is real). 
65. Marc R. Stanley, When Bad Companies Happen to Good People, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 517,529 
(2008). 
66. Consider, for example, legal malpractice with its opposing camps of lawyers who represent 
lawyers sued for malpractice and plaintiffs suing lawyers. See, e.g., Joseph F. Cunningham et aI., An 
Overlooked Defense to Professional Liability, 43 MD. BAR J. 4, 60-61 (July/Aug. 2010) (referring to how 
"[dJisgruntled" plaintiffs "proceed with clever arguments" that demonstrate the "increased ingenuity of 
... their new attorneys"). 
67. While I have my personal sympathies, I resist "taking sides." This article is about a process, 
not an assessment of the substance of that process. 
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compensation for lawyers on both sides are large organizations: defend-
ants' lawyers directly through hourly fees and plaintiff's lawyers less di-
rectly through contingent fees.6s This means that unlike other areas of 
practice-particularly those involving low-income litigants described be-
low69-there are resources available to both "sides" to not only articulate 
their professional identity, but to also communicate that identity. This is a 
recipe for intense professional identity as advocacy. 
1. The Professional Identity of the Plaintiff's Bar 
There are two primary mechanisms through which the plaintiff's bar 
engages in group advocacy: advertising and professional organizations. 
A crucial element of expressing professional identity of the plaintiff's 
bar is through advertising.70 Ads on billboards, television, buses and sub-
ways, yellow pages, and lists of "best attorneys" make the personal injury 
bar the most omnipresent segment of the legal profession in America. 
While such advertising is designed to attract clients,71 it is the content of 
how this is done and how it expresses a consistent professional ide~tity that 
is of importance here. 
Perhaps equally important, if less visible, are the efforts of the Ameri-
can Association for Justice-the primary professional organization that 
acts on behalf of the personal injury bar.72 The rhetoric employed by this 
group is consistent with the image fostered through advertising by the per-
sonal injury bar. 
a. Fighting for "You" 
Many communications from the personal injury bar note that personal 
injury lawyers will "fight for yoU.'073 The second person pronoun "you" has 
68. Gillian Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000). 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 142-55. 
70. The line of Supreme Court cases establishing First Amendment protection for attorney ad-
vertising and tracing the limits of that protection has been of incalculable significance in enabling the 
personal injury bar to communicate its message and, thereby, intensifying professional group identity 
conflicts. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (recognizing First Amendment protec-
tions for attorney advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (establishing that 
prohibiting in-person solicitation is constitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (targeted mailing to potential personal injury clients is constitutionally protected); Shapero 
v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (direct mail solicitation constitutional); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, 
Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (30 day blackout period for solicitation of potential personal injury clients is 
constitutional). 
71. It should come as no surprise that this kind of advertising is successful at attracting clients, 
although competition among personal injury lawyers remains fierce. Sara Parikh, How the Spider 
Catches the Fly: Referral Networks in the Plaintiffs Personal Injury Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243, 
264 (2006). As is so characteristic of discourse about personal injury practice, even the title of this 
article offers a not very subtle clue as to where the sympathy of the author lies in the personal injury 
wars. 
72. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.org!cps/rde/xchgljusticelhs.xsllde-
fault.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
73. There are numerous examples. See Personal Injury Lawyers Can Fight for You, http:// 
www.sylw.orglpersonal-injury-lawyers-can-fight-for-you.html(lastvisitedApr.11. 2012); LAW OFFICES 
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enormous power: the "you" addresses the reader directly. "You" necessa-
rily entails "non-you" or, even more tellingly, a third person - "them."74 
The "you" also extends to jurors-the epitome of the plain old citizen75-
and the notion that "tort reformers" do not trust jurors to do the right 
thing.76 The power of "fight" is also telling: one doesn't "sue" a powerful 
opponent: "you" fight against "them" in the mode of David and Goliath.77 
b. "Your Rights" 
Often these formulations place the issues at stake in terms of "rights," 
thus situating the "fight" in constitutional terms.78 Such a "fight" for 
"rights" recalls the paradigmatic image of the "good lawyer"-the lawyer 
who fights for "civil rights" in the "Civil Rights Movement" sense of the 
term.79 Yet even further is how this talk of "rights" and "justice" specifi-
cally places such lawsuits as vindicating law. Such cases are in the public 
interest-a classic technique of the professional identity wars.80 
Perhaps these themes are best summed up by how the well-known or-
ganization representing the interests of the personal injury bar-the Amer-
ican Trial Lawyers Association-changed its name in 2007 to the American 
Association for Justice.81 Its self-identified mission is "to promote a fair 
and effective justice system. "82 
c. The "Other": Powerful Interests 
These formulations also link up with the deep-rooted populism long 
traceable in American history and American culture: "the people"83 
OF JEFF MARTIN, http://www.jeffmartinlaw.coml(last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (an experienced attorney 
"will fight for you"); The Leading Top eZines Article Site on the Net, http://www.topezinesarticies.coml 
culture-and-society/you-should-find-a-top-maryland-personal-injury-attorney-to-fight-for-youl (note 
the web address itself) (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); THE LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH J. CARIGLlA, P.e., 
http://www.cariglia.coml(last visited Apr. 7, 2012) ("we will fight for you, and we fight to win"). 
74. For an account of the power of the second person pronouns, albeit in an entirely different 
context, see DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, A SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I'LL NEVER Do AGAIN 266-67 
(1997) (discussing "the near imperative use of the second person" in cruise ship advertising). 
75. Stanley, supra note 65, at 521. 
76. Perhaps ironically, a leading text on plaintiff representation in personal injury cases devotes a 
substantial amount of time on how to identify jurors who believe in "tort reform" in order to exercise 
peremptory challenges so they do not serve on juries. DAVID BALL, DA VID BALL ON DAMAGES 85-87 
(3d ed. 2011). 
77. The David and Goliath image specifically emerges in some personal injury discourse. See 
The David and Goliath History of Our Civil Justice System against Toxic Waste and Environmental 
Harm, PANAMA CITY, FLA. INJURY LAWYER BLOG, http://www.personalinjuryJawyer.comlfeed-iteml 
the-david-v-goliath-history-our-civil-justice-system-against-toxic-waste-environme (Sept. 30, 2010). 
78. LAW OFFICES OF TOBIN, REITMAN, GREENSTEIN, CARUSO, WIENER, KONRAY, & KESSLER, 
P.e., http://www.teamlaw.coml(last visited Apr. 7, 2012) ("we fight for the rights of injured people"). 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59. 
80. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
81. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.orglcps/rde/xchgljustice!hs.xsUde-
fault.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
82. Id. 
83. See MORGAN & MORGAN, http://www.forthepeople.coml(last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
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against the "special interests" and "the rich."84 The American Association 
for Justice, for example, is "taking on the most powerful interests."85 The 
rhetoric can be heated: corporations are "artificial creatures"86 who, as 
noted above, confront a system of "David v. Goliath."87 The personal in-
jury lawyer is David with the slingshot and the only chance an ordinary 
citizen has to fight the power. One law firm sets up the distinctions quite 
neatly: the firm is "dedicated to protecting the people, not the powerful."88 
Another formulation is as follows: 
Corporations Value Profits Over Safety 
We aggressively pursue personal injury and wrongful death 
claims on behalf of our clients, seeking to hold corporations 
accountable for ignoring safety measures in order to turn a 
quick profit. We .... tak[ e] on powerful interests, including 
the oil and gas companies . . .89 
2. Counterattack: Professional Identity and the "Defense Bar" 
The personal injury defense bar primarily consists of firms retained by 
insurers and, in the case of large class action toxic tort matters, by depart-
ments within law firms. Given that this practice almost exclusively repre-
sents organizations, it would not be feasible or effective to market services 
to the general public. Moreover, the defense bar faces a substantial chal-
lenge in promoting the collective interests of their clients. These firms re-
present clients who are not easily portrayed in sympathetic terms. After 
all, insurance companies and large organizations are hardly well-regarded 
in the popular imagination. Nevertheless, the defense bar deploys and 
draws upon a set of stories to support its own morality tale of good versus 
evil. 
a. A Creation Myth 
The defense bar has its own organization to articulate its identity and 
interests-the Defense Research Institute ("DRI"). Calling itself the 
84. For an overview of populist rhetoric in American culture and politics, see MICHAEL KAZIN, 
THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (1995); see also WILLIAM F. HOLMES, AMERICAN 
POPULISM (1994). 
85. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, http://www.justice.orglcps/rde/xchgljustice/hs.xsl/de-
fault.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
86. Stanley, supra note 65, at 517. 
87. Id. at 526. 
88. ATLANTA PERSONAL INJURY ATTORNEY, CIVIL RIGHTS, WHISTLEBLOWER LAWYER, http:// 
www.hornsbylaw.coml(last visited Apr. 7, 2012); see also Personal Injury Attorneys Stand up for YOll 
Against Powerful Business and Corporate Interests, LAW OFFICES OF PAUL WHITFIELD & ASSOCIATES, 
http://www.whitfieldattorney.comldocs/personalinjuryattorneysstandupforyouagainstpowerfulcorporate 
interests.pdf (stories about unreasonable positions taken by personal injury defendants with document 
titled as stated in the uri address). 
89. PHILADELPHIA PERSONAL INJURY ATTORNEY, http://www.mswattorneys.coml(last visited 
Apr. 7, 2012). 
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"voice of the defense bar,"90 DRI is explicit in articulating its role as filling 
a "need for a voice to counter plaintiff's attorneys. "91 Consider the follow-
ing story told by DRI about its origins-a creation myth, if you will: 
While defense attorneys continued to handle the defense of 
individual claims in a traditional, time-proven manner, 
plaintiffs' lawyers began to use new tactics and fashion 
novel arguments to boost the amount of awards ... Black-
board arguments and other hitherto unknown courtroom 
tactics were inflating the damages for "pain and suffering" 
to astronomical amounts. Contingent fees grew dispropor-
tionately, and legal liability was being extended beyond the 
bounds of reason. On the legislative front, plaintiffs' repre-
sentatives began to appear before legislative committees to 
seek expanded liability while opposing any sort of reform in 
the personal injury law.92 
The story continues that "[d]efense lawyers recognized the growing 
danger and the harmful impact that excessive awards would have on the 
civil justice system," hence the need to "unite the defense effort" through 
the founding of DRI.93 
This story is a history by a professional in-group about the rise of a 
"bad" out-group, which, in turn, prompts the need for the in-group-the 
white hats-to counter the social ill generated by the greed of the out-
group.94 Note that the history is driven by "plaintiffs' lawyers" and "plain-
tiffs' representatives": the players in this narrative are clearly one lawyer 
group against another lawyer group. Also note that in a remarkable paral-
lel with the discourse of the plaintiffs' bar, it is law, the very "civil justice 
system" itself-that is at stake and on whose behalf the defense bar is 
struggling to vindicate against the forces of evil. 
This story demonstrates professional identity as advocacy. Neverthe-
less, the story only suggests the more powerful story that is at the core of 
the defense bar's identity advocacy: the "litigation explosion." 
90. DRI, http://www.dri.orgl (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
91. A History of DRI, DRI 1 (2005), http://www.dri.org/ContentDirectory/Public/AboutJDRI-
History2005.pdf. 
92. Id. It is noteworthy that this narrative also hearkens to an earlier time-a "traditional, time 
proven" way of lawyering-thus contrasting the trouble caused by personal injury lawyers with the 
ideal of Abraham Lincoln and Atticus Finch. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19, 55-59. 
93. Id. at 1-3. 
94. There are also remarkable instances of attempting more explicitly to appropriate the stock 
figure of the "good lawyer" in terms I have already discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 
53-65. One example is an explicit comparison of a President of DRI to Atticus Finch-the embodi-
ment of integrity in the face of injustice. Steven T. Taylor, Dallas Lawyer with Atticus Finch·Like 
Attributes Leads the "Voice of the Defense Bar", 27 OF COUNSEL 7 (2008). 
24 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 31:7 
b. The "Litigation Explosion" 
A central image in the personal injury discourse is that America is 
being overrun by a "litigation explosion."95 What is remarkable is that this 
notion is contradicted by empirical studies of judicial dockets, which con-
sistently show that the area of litigation growing most rapidly is commercial 
litigation.96 Indeed, sometimes the "litigation explosion" is accepted as a 
given, thus warranting no or minimal independent support.97 
Perhaps the key to how the litigation explosion is articulated and un-
derstood is through anecdotes of laughable overreaching by the plaintiffs' 
bar. Such anecdotes carry enormous rhetorical power.98 The following dis-
cussion surveys a few of the more striking stories of this type. 
1. Of Seesaws and Childhood Obesity 
Life Without Lawyers: Liberating Americans from Too Much Law by 
Philip K. Howard99 is a recent book ostensibly devoted to how, as its name 
suggests, law and laws are ruining the country. In the book and in inter-
views, it is clear that Howard, despite the broadly framed title, does not 
mean "too much law" and "lawyers" in the general sense; rather, he is re-
ferring only to tort law and personal injury lawyers.lOO In making his argu-
ment, Howard employs a series of "ghastly anecdotes."101 One involves 
the looming threat of seesaw litigation: "If any child who falls on a seesaw 
can sue, all seesaws will be removed from playgrounds," which "results in 
the consistent removal of school playgrounds, which leads to the larger 
95. Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences, 
21 BYU J. PUB. L.179, 180 (2007); David Neubaer & Stephen S. Meinhold, Too Quick to Sue? Public 
Perceptions of the Litigation Explosion, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 1 (1994). 
96. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECI"IVE FROM THE 
COURT STATISTICS PROJEcr 23-24 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2003) (noting that tort filings decreased 
in 30 states surveyed); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: Or, the Federal Courts Since 
the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 945 (the largest increase in civil federal court findings is in 
commercial litigation). 
97. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 95, at 180 (arguing that there is "substantial evidence of a 
'litigation explosion' that is consuming the productivity, profits, and general effectiveness of many 
American industries" while noting in a footnote that "the seriousness of the problem is hotly 
disputed"). 
98. An element of this power is how crucial-if not essential-narratives are in understanding 
experience and "reality." For an example in the context of the development of law, see ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING TIlE LAW 114-15 (2000) ("[k]nowing how to tell [stories] 
and to comprehend them may be part of our human survival kit"). Perhaps the seminal article on the 
role of narrative in legal discourse is Robert Cover, The Supreme Courts, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). For other excellent discussions of narrative and the law, see 
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989). For a more general non-legal treatment, see LOUIS O. MINK, NARRA-
TIVE FORM AS A COGNITIVE INSTRUMENT, IN The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical 
Understanding 129-49 (Robert H. Canary & Henry Kozicki, eds. 1978); Hayden White, The Value of 
Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL INOUIRY 5 (1980). 
99. PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE wrn'IOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM Too MUCH 
LAW (2009). 
100. See generally id. 
101. Non Fiction Review: Life without Lawyers: Liberating Americans from Too Much Law, PUB-
LISHER'S WEEKLY, http://www.publishersweekly.com/978-0-393-06566-4 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
2012] PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY 25 
problem of childhood obesity."102 Rhetorically, the statement is a string 
not only of possibilities but also of inevitabilities: all falls from seesaws will 
generate lawsuits; all seesaws will be removed from playgrounds; the lack 
of seesaws will cause childhood obesity. While logicians would find this 
reasoning dubious at best, the argument demonstrates elements typical of 
professional identity rhetoric: a ridiculous example of litigation (seesaw 
cases) and how this type of litigation generates social harm which is not in 
the public interest. In this instance, the choice of the ridiculous suit is par-
ticularly compelling: innocent playground equipment-the stuff of child-
hood innocence-is being taken away, which not only eliminates fun, but 
exacerbates a well-publicized and intensifying public health threat to chil-
dren.103 This is an image of a personal injury lawyer not only as a killjoy, 
but as, quite literally, guilty of child endangerment. 
It is also notable that Howard is a large firm partner104-a theme to be 
explored later in the Article. 
n. Of McDonald's and Million Dollar Pants 
The famous case of a massive award for spilled McDonald's coffee105 
triggered satire in Seinfeld106 and is so embedded in the American psyche 
that a book on personal injury advocacy offers advice on voir dire of jurors 
should the McDonald's Coffee case crop Up.107 While some have sought to 
correct the ridiculous image with the seriousness of what "really hap-
pened,"108 which is far more sympathetic than the myth suggests, the power 
of the story remains. 
102. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Now is the Time for 'Life Without Lawyers,' Says Covington & Burling 
Partner, ABA J. DAILY, http://www.abajournal.com/news/now_is_the_time_for_life_without_lawyers_ 
says_covington_burlin~partner (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
103. In 2010 alone, at least three books have been published regarding this issue. ROBERT A. 
PIWTLOW, OVERWEIGHT: WHAT KIDS SAY: WHAT'S REALLY CAUSING THE CHILDHOOD OBESITY EpI-
DEMIC (2010); PREVENTING CIIiLDHOOD OIlESrry: EVIDENCE POLICY AND PRACI'ICE (Elizabeth Wa-
ters et aI., eds.) (2010); JENNIFER A. O'DEA, CHILDHOOD OBESITY PREVENTION: INTERNATIONAL 
RESEARCH, CONTROVERSIES, AND INTERVENTIONS (2010). The Center for Disease Control considers 
the problem significant enough to devote a separate section of its website to it. Obesity and Over-
weight, THE CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/index.html(last 
visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
104. Howard is a partner at Covington and Burling. Zahorsky, supra note 102. 
105. Only an order, not an opinion, was issued in the case. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, 
P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994). 
106. Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the Debate over Tort 
Reform, 26 CAP. U.L. REV. 701 (1997). Greenlee describes the episode, along with quotes from the 
dialogue, in detail. ld. at 704-09. 
107. BALL, supra note 76, at 87. Bali's advice is for attorneys not to convince prospective jurors 
whether the verdict was fair or not, but, rather, "do nothing but ask questions about it" and "take no 
sides." Evidently the issue of "spilled beverage" liability has become serious enough to warrant a sepa-
rate American Law Reports entry. Michelle C. Kaminsky, Liability for Vendor for Food or Beverage 
Spilled on Customer, 64 A.L.R. 5th (1998). 
108. Such efforts have been published in both law reviews and in bar journals. Kevin G. Cain, 
And Now the Rest of the Story . .. : The McDonald's Coffee Lawsuit, 11 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 14 
(2007); Greenlee, supra note 106; Steven A. Meyer, Too Bad to Be True, 28 PA. LAW 43,44 (2006) (the 
subtitle of the article is "[w]hen someone tells a story about an outrageous jury decision, check it out: 
Odds are it may never have happened"). 
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And then there is the story of how, as a New York Times article put it, 
a "Judge Tries Suing Pants Off Dry Cleaners."109 In this instance, an ad-
ministrative law judge sued a neighborhood dry cleaner for $67.3 million 
for misplacing his pants.110 While not as pervasive as the McDonald's case, 
the story of the judge and his pants still became "a worldwide symbol of 
legal abuse by seeking jackpot justice111-a preposterous circumstance as-
sumed to be representative of litigation. 
In the rhetoric of professional identity, the underlying validity of these 
stories as both true and representative are accepted without question. 
They both establish and reinforce stories of frivolous lawsuits, greed, and 
overreaching-the defining characteristics of the "litigation explosion" 
and, by extension, what the plaintiffs' bar is all about. 
3. Battle Is Joined 
In response to the McDonald's Coffee tale, the personal injury bar 
decries "those who concoct mythical lawsuit anecdotes" and "generalize 
from the occasional aberrant case."112 Moreover, as noted above,113 the 
term "trial lawyers" itself has become such an epithet in political discourse 
that the most prominent association of personal injury attorneys recently 
changed its name from the "American Association of Trial Attorneys" to 
the "American Association for Justice"114-a telling attempt to seize the 
moral high ground in the push/pull of professional advocacy. Indeed, there 
is a deep political and ideological dimension to this debate, with "liberal" 
trial lawyers wary of free market capitalism 115 and "conservative" political 
leaders arguing in favor of "tort reform. "116 
In the end, what is striking is how the debate focuses on lawyers them-
selves and their rhetoric as a "group," with each group excoriating the mo-
tives and social impact of the professional activities of the other group. 
B. Criminal Justice 
As the center of law and the popular imagination, criminal defense 
attorneys and prosecutors assume mythical roles of good against evil, both 
109. Ariel Sabar & Suevon Lee, Judge Tries Suing Pants off Dry Cleaners, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2007, at A 13. 
110. [d. For the denouement, see Ariel Sabar, In Case of Missing Trousers, Aggrieved Party Loses 
Again, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007 (the trial court found that "that the plaintiff is not entitled to any 
relief whatsoever"). 
111. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2517, 2525 (200S) (quoting Lubna Takuri, Judge Rules in Favor of Dry Cleaner in $54M Suit Over 
Missing Pants, LAW.COM (June 26, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=llS2762359671). 
112. Stanley, supra note 65, at 519. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes Sl-S2. 
114. Stanley, supra note 65, at 51S. 
115. [d. (in the context of defending personal injury lawsuits, offering a "contrary view" to the 
notion "that the free market regulates itself'). 
116. Litigation and Professional Responsibility: Is Overlawyering Overtaking Democracy?, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETIIICS 1433 (200S) (transcript of panel). This political divide should not be simplified, 
however, as some conservative Christian groups argue against tort reform. Stanley, supra note 65, at 
529. 
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seeking to bear the mantle of truth and justice. There are, of course, inher-
ent differences in these roles in the special context of criminal law: prosecu-
tors frame their role as pursuing justice to victims and preserving safety and 
the rule of law to society at large, while defense attorneys, classically, frame 
their role as preserving individual rightsY7 At least from a broad perspec-
tive, however, both claims are legitimate, and, after all, the entire process is 
called the criminal justice system. Identity advocacy, however, shifts the 
emphasis from system to good and bad actors within the system. 
1. Overreaching Prosecutors: Political Ambition and Ego 
It is a deep seated notion that the prosecution function "is to seek 
justice, not merely to convict."118 In the negative discourse about prosecu-
tors, however, this is the goal that is honored in the breach. An extensive 
literature excoriates the "scorekeeping mentality" of prosecutors: they 
(that is, prosecutors as a group) promote convictions over justicel19 by 
withholding exculpatory evidence tending to show the innocence of crimi-
nal defendants.12o There is the pervasive image of the politically ambitious 
prosecutor whose goal is to secure high profile convictions in order to pro-
mote reelection or higher office.121 Indeed, the rapacious, unethical, politi-
cally motivated prosecutor is a longstanding stock character in American 
popular culture.122 Prosecutors also "flex their muscles in the courtroom 
solely for the purpose of posturing in front of the jury."123 
117. See Kalthleen P. Browe, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will not Go Away, 
77 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 766 (1994) ("prosecuting attorneys see themselves as protectors of justice, and 
criminal defense attorneys see themselves as defenders of individual rights"). 
118. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTOR FUNCTION Standard 3-
1.2(c). The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT similarly note that a "prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." R. 3.8 cmt. This notion is 
embedded in Supreme Court jurisprudence as well. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) 
(government's interest "in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done"). See also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM L.J. 607 
(1999); R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us about a Prosecu-
tor's Ethical Duty To "Seek Justice", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006). 
119. See, e.g., Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play 
the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 
283 (2001); Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convic-
tions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996). For a response to Bresler's article, see Thomas Hagemann, 
Confessions from a Scorekeeper: A Reply to Mr. Bresler, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151 (1996). 
120. Alafair S. Burke, Talking about Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2119 (2010) 
(describing prosecutors who "withhold exculpatory evidence that might undermine their impressive 
conviction rates"). 
121. Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got To Do With It?, 18 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2005); Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death 
Penalty: The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates' Campaigning on Capital Cases, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH· 
ICS 941 (1994). 
122. THEY WON'T FORGET (NYT 1937) (features Claude Reins in a "savage characterization of 
the ambitious prosecutor"). PRINCE OF THE CITY (New York Magazine 1981) (involves a plot involving 
"new, politically ambitious prosecutors, hungry for blood-anyone's blood"). 
123. Cassidy, supra note 118, at 672; Burke, supra note 120, at 2119 (describing literature that 
portrays prosecutors as "mak[ing] prejudicial and misleading statements to both judgments and 
juries"). 
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Consider the following indictment of prosecutors by a criminal defense 
attorney: 
The prosecution is not content just to use superior resources 
against defendants. They are in hot pursuit of defense law-
yers, especially those that are highly skilled with reputations 
to match. Some prosecutors want civil, criminal and disci-
plinary immunity for their actions. They seek to further 
their reputations by trapping, prosecuting, or obtaining dis-
ciplinary sanctions against defense lawyers. In some cases 
they are found to go overboard in their zeal, they want im-
munity and their own Code of Ethics whose violations, if 
any, they shall determine ... [W]e will be creating a special 
class of impervious prosecutors, unchecked in whatever vio-
lations of the Constitution and law that they may 
commit. "124 
Another example, this time from the academic literature: 
[A]s the courts continue to recognize new rights of criminal 
defendants, prosecutors continue to devise new and im-
proper ways to impair the exercise of those rights ... Prose-
cutors have found new ways to subvert the rules of evidence 
and to introduce inadmissible evidence indirectly under the 
guise of some feigned legitimate purpose. Prosecutors also 
have created charades to mask deals with cooperating wit-
nesses in order to prevent exposure of the agreement 
through cross-examination. Prosecutors have devised other 
schemes and tactics to prevent the accused from gaining ac-
cess to exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors have also used 
their control of experts to introduce outlandish opinions, 
distort the facts, and mislead the juryP5 
Here are the telltale signs of identity advocacy: the branding of the 
"other" professional group collectively (albeit with a single nod to "some" 
of the out group) as selfish, self-interested, promoting reputations with 
monumental consequences. They run amok, violating constitutional rights. 
There is an assumption that these instances are common, even the norm 
among prosecutors. As one commentator characterizes it, there is a "pre-
vailing rhetoric of fault" in discourse about prosecutorsY6 
124. Thomas F. Liotti, The Uneven Playing Field: Ethical Disparities between the Prosecution and 
Defense Functions in Criminal Cases, 17 TOURO L. REV. 467, 501 (2001). 
125. Bennett L. Gershman, "Hard Strikes and Foul Blows": Berger v. United States 75 Years After, 
42 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 177,204-205 (2010). 
126. Burke, supra note 120, at 2127. Burke relates a brief story to prove this point at the begin-
ning of his article: After seeing a "former law school ethics professor for the first time in fifteen years 
... "I had barely gotten out the initial words-I was a prosecutor-before hearing her response: Mor-
ally compromised, were you?" Id. at 2119. 
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Moreover, there are highly publicized instances of prosecutorial over-
reach.127 At the national level, the Duke Lacrosse case, involving accusa-
tions of rape and ensuing revelations about prosecutor Michael D. Nifong's 
handling of the case, captured the public imaginationPS After Nifong pur-
sued indictments of three Duke Lacrosse players for rape, with Nifong 
making multiple statements to the media about the case, all charges against 
the three were dismissed. As the matter unfolded and as more information 
about the case emerged, Nifong became the embodiment of the overreach-
ing prosecutor, evidently with quite a bit of justification. This image has 
appeared in scholarship,129 in ensuing investigations by the Attorney Gen-
eral of North Carolina,130 and, ultimately, in proceedings that led to 
Nifong's disbarment by the North Carolina BaLl3l Not surprisingly, the 
defense counsel in the case "repeatedly said Nifong pursued the case for 
political gain. "132 
Although by no means reaching the same national level of public scru-
tiny as the Duke Lacrosse case, other cases of more local interest also in-
volve prosecutors who fit the stereotype of the ambitious prosecutor.133 
2. Returning the Favor: How Can You Defend Those People? 
Prosecutors inhabit unique territory in identity advocacy. On the one 
hand, they operate under specific ethical restrictions134-albeit fuzzy-as 
to what they can or cannot say, the boundaries of which are, ultimately, of 
127. For a detailed discussion of examples, see Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecutorial Sounds Bites: 
When Do They Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L. REV. 1021, 1038-51 (2010) (citing examples of improper 
statements by prosecutors regarding a defendant's "character and race," a defendant's "admissions or 
confessions," the legitimacy of DNA and scientific tests, and the creditability of witness credibility). See 
also Sarah K. Fleisch, The Ethics of Legal Commentary: A Reconsideration of the Need for an Ethical 
Code in Light of the Duke Lacrosse Maller, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 599 (2007). 
12S. See Duke Lacrosse Sexual Assault Case News, N.Y. TIMES http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ 
reference/timestopics/organizations/d/duke_universitylduke_lacrosse_sexual_assauICcase/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (tracing coverage of the case in the New York Times). 
129. See, e.g., R. Taylor Matthews, The Duke Lacrosse Rape Case: A Public Branding, Is There a 
Remedy?, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 669 (2008); Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, 
and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007). 
130. The ensuing investigation of the matter by the North Carolina Attorney General Roy A. 
Cooper concluded that Nifong was "unchecked," "overreaching," and a "rogue prosecutor." Duff Wil-
son & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES, (April 12, 2007), http:// 
www.nytimes.coml2007/04/12/us/12duke.html. 
131. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of 
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (200S). 
132. Defense Attorneys: Rush to Prove Guilt in Duke Lacrosse Case, WRAL.cOM http:// 
www.wral.comlnews/locaVstory/1617292/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
133. For a recent example, see In re Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 2011) (finding of unethical 
conduct by a prosecutor, who subsequently became a state legislator, for publicizing a Grand Jury 
transcript to counter criticism in his handling of a politically charged case). 
134. The most prominent guideline is in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.S, which prohib-
its prosecutors from "making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening 
public condemnation of the accused." The Rule goes on to mandate that a prosecutor "exercise reason-
able care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or 
associated with the prosecutor" from making such comments. Id. 
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constitutional dimension.135 For example, ethical guidelines prohibit prose-
cutors from making public statements that "heighten[] public condemna-
tion of the accused. "136 While the specificity and enforcement of such 
standards, as noted above, have been criticized,137 they furnish at least 
some limitation on openly criticizing defense counsel. 
On the other hand, prosecutors enjoy an inherent advantage in the 
identity advocacy wars. Prosecutors pursue justice by seeking to punish 
accused criminals, and, thus, a prosecutor's morality is embedded in the 
criminal process itself. There is little need to criticize the morality of de-
fense counsel when their clients are accused of often brutal and reprehensi-
ble crimes for which, as the assumption goes, they are guilty.138 Public 
condemnation of accused rapists or murderers is pretty much a given with-
out effort on the part prosecutors, and, by extension, those who defend the 
rapists and murderers are the enemy of truth and justice. As a result, iden-
tity advocacy for prosecutors, in many respects, takes care of itself. 
Given these realities, much of the rhetoric in favor of the professional 
identity of prosecutors is less explicit and more subtle than that of the crim-
inal defense bar. For example, the preeminent national organization for 
state prosecutors-the National District Attorneys Association-charac-
terizes itself as "the voice of America's prosecutors ... in their efforts to 
protect the rights and safety of the people.,,139 There is nothing here that is 
directly critical of the defense bar. There is, however, an inherent critique 
of the defense counsel insofar as it is the criminal justice system-defense 
counsel included-that pursues justice, not just the "efforts" of prosecu-
tors. This organization, however, omits defense counsel from this effort, 
thus transforming an integrated system into one in which only one element 
of the system-prosecutors-are on the side of the "rights and safety of the 
people." Indeed, the seemingly moral high ground enjoyed by prosecutors 
does appear in strident form in popular discourse. This anti-defense coun-
sel discourse is embodied in the oft-asked question, and the title of one 
recent booP40 and yet another book:141 "How Can You Defend Those 
People?" 
135. The leading case is Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) (seeking to bal-
ance prosecutor's First Amendment rights with the constitutional concerns about a "substantial likeli-
hood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding"). 
136. MODEL RULES, supra note 21. 
137. See generally Levenson, supra note 127. 
138. It is notable that these spectacular instances of brutality are only a small subset of criminal 
cases, the vast majority of which involve matters, such as drug possession, that typically garner attention 
only in the aggregate or when celebrities are involved. 
139. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, http:www.ndaa.org (last visited Apr. 7, 
2012). 
140. MICKEY SHERMAN, How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE? (2008). 
141. JAMES S. KUNIN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE LAWYER (1983). The phrase also crops up in other contexts. See, e.g., Barbara Allen Bab-
cock, The Duty to Defend, 114 YALE L.J. 1489, 1515 (2005). 
2012] PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AS ADVOCACY 
V. Two SPECIAL CASES: Low-INCOME LITIGANTS AND 
W ALL STREET LAWYERS 
31 
To the "man on the street," being a lawyer is usually about being a 
criminal lawyer or a personal injury lawyer. There is virtually no attention 
paid to a wide swath of the profession whose identity does not involve re-
peated opposition to "counter-specialists." Such lawyers include the trusts 
and estates lawyer, the real estate lawyer, the lawyer who counsels small 
businesses, the lawyer who engages in a little bit of this and a little bit of 
that-that is, the many lawyers who, with little or no fanfare, engage in 
non-contingent fee work on behalf of, typically, middle class clients. 
However, two particularly significant segments of legal services tend to 
operate under the radar screen. These are lawyers engaged in an extraordi-
narily large amount of litigation involving low-income litigants and large-
scale commercial litigation. In the first case, there is professional identity 
as advocacy, but the nature of work, based on a number of reasons I will 
trace below, generate an ironic result: no one is listening. In the second 
case, there is no professional identity as advocacy; there is, rather, profes-
sional identity as proxy for status. The whys and wherefores of these two 
situations are interesting case studies of how professional identity advocacy 
has an impact even in contexts in which it does not exist. 
A. Professional Identity in Search of an Audience: 
Advocacy on Behalf of Low-Income Clients 
As I have traced in detail elsewhere,142 there is a massive adjudicatory 
system that operates below the level of attention of most observers, includ-
ing most lawyers and the culture at large. This is the representation of 
individual low-income clients. 
These cases fall into distinct categories. First, there are landlord-ten-
ant matters, adjudicated in an array of fora that are both overwhelmed with 
cases and overwhelmingly under-resourced.143 Second, there are cases in-
volving claims for government benefits primarily adjudicated in a patch-
work of state and federal administrative agencies.144 Third, there are 
family law cases often involving child custody.145 
Few lawyers represent litigants in these cases. In contrast to personal 
injury practice, where the defendant's resources fund the representation,146 
in these cases there is no opportunity to make a profit because the clients, 
by definition, have little or no resources. Thus, those with fundamental 
142. Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL. PROF. 89 (2004-2005). 
143. For descriptions of such landlord-tenant courts, see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: 
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 
(1992); Rubinson, supra note 142, at 108-109; Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrep-
resented Poor: Revising the Role of Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2057-63 
(1999) (describing Boston's "Housing Court"); A System in Collapse, Abell Rep., Mar. 2003, at 1.5. 
144. Rubinson, supra note 142, at 109-12. 
145. Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU 1. PUB. L. 
123-24 (1993). 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
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interests at issue-food, shelter, custody of children-are least able to ob-
tain legal services and almost invariably receive minimal process in litigat-
ing their matters.147 
In terms of professional identity as advocacy, there is an immediate 
distinction between these matters and personal injury and criminal justice: 
the number of lawyers engaged in this work is miniscule.148 There is, how-
ever, a corps of lawyers who do this kind of work: attorneys funded by the 
Legal Services Corporation, Legal Aid and Legal Services groups, and 
other organizations primarily funded by private foundations and, at times, 
governmental subsidies. Nevertheless, with few exceptions discussed be-
low,149 the number of clients in need of legal services far outstrips the sup-
ply of lawyers who engage in this work, and the low profile of these 
litigants preclude professional identity as advocacy from gaining traction.150 
Ironically, this is in the teeth of a type of practice that, perhaps, has an 
immensely powerful impulse towards professional identity. These lawyers 
usually represent low-income clients because of a deep personal belief in 
remedying injustice and inequality, even given the rapidly increasing dis-
parity in salaries between those doing this work as compared to those en-
gaged in private practice. l5l Public interest lawyers would like nothing 
more than to publicize their identity and those of their clients. There are, 
however, virtually no movies, books, news broadcasts, or other means of 
popular information that examine the tens of thousands of unrepresented 
litigants. The situation is, as one commentator has put it, the functional 
equivalent of "silence in the court."152 
There are exceptions to this general picture. The long history of con-
troversy surrounding funding the legal services corporation is perhaps the 
147. Rubinson, supra note 142. 
148. Numerous measures demonstrate this, but perhaps the most powerful has been set forth by 
David Luban, who found that about 1 % of the $100 billion legal industry is devoted to the needs of 
low-income Americans, or, while there is "about 1 lawyer for every 240 nonpoor Americans" there is 
"only one lawyer for every 9000 Americans" who would qualify for legal aid. David Luban, Taking Out 
the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003). 
For a classic treatment of the impact of this power differential, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" 
Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 1974 LAW. & Soc. 95, 108-09 (noting that 
pro se's are "one shot" players facing "repeat players" in litigation, and thus, are subject to "mass 
processing with little of the individuated attention of full-dress adjudication"). 
149. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
150. There remain calls for a "Civil Gideon" in order to guarantee representation in civil cases, 
but these efforts have not been successful. The Supreme Court has held that "an indigent litigant has a 
right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty." Lassiter 
v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). State efforts to recognize a Civil Gideon have 
also not fared well. See Lee Shevell, Civil Gideon: The Poor Man's Fight, 16 PUB. INT. L. REV. 32, 
34-35 (2010). . 
151. According to the National Association for Law Placement, as of 2008, the starting salary for 
lawyers in civil legal services is $40,000; for firms of 50 or fewer lawyers it is $80,000; for the largest 
firms it is $145,000. New Findings on Salaries for Public Interest Attorneys, NALP BULLETIN, http:// 
www.nalp.org/2008sepnewfindings (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
152. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' 
Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). 
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most prominent example.153 Another instance relates to "IOLTA"-"in-
terest on lawyers' trust accounts"-through which interest on client funds 
placed in escrow are used to fund legal services. The controversy centers 
on whether such funds are clients' "property" and, if so, would using inter-
est generated by these funds for other purposes constitute a constitution-
ally impermissible "taking"? The Supreme Court has entered the fray in 
two casesI54 that, in the end, leave the constitutionality of IOLTA uncertain 
and dependent on circumstances. Both the LSC and IOLTA controversies 
are intensely political, hot button issues.155 
Nevertheless, these issues are not joined in remotely the same way as 
personal injury law and criminal law. There are too few lawyers and too 
little money at stake for it to generate the traction that in terms of pUblicity 
is the lifeblood of professional identity as advocacy. 
B. Professional Identity as Proxy for Status: The Wall Street Lawyer 
A second wholly different group, and equally telling for purposes of 
this Article, involves lawyers who practice in large firms that represent 
large organizations. 
The work of these firms is little known outside the narrow culture of 
law schools-mostly elite law schools-and the increasing numbers of large 
law firms themselves. For sure one could argue that this largely invisible 
yet huge area of practice generates substantial financial impact by multiply-
ing transaction costs for business-costs that find their way into consumer 
prices-yet this group maintains its prestige and is virtually never subject 
to public scrutiny.156 Indeed, the book on "Life without Lawyers" discussed 
above is about life without personal injury lawyers, not life without large 
firm lawyers, with the author being a large firm lawyer himselfI57 -a telling 
example of the point. Moreover, many large firms shy away from offend-
ing larger potentials or actual organizational clients, and thus do not take 
on, for example, civil rights employment cases or environmental cases.158 
The increasing importance of this type of practice, however, is undeni-
able. From 1975 to 2007, American law firms with 200 or more lawyers 
153. For a detailed history of the Legal Services Corporation and its predecessors, see Alan W. 
Housman, Linda E. Perle, A Brief History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States (Center for Law 
and Public Policy 2007). For regulations that limit the types of cases LSC-funded organizations can 
undertake, see 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (2010). 
154. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 
U.S. 216 (2003). 
155. Both IOLTA cases were brought by the Washington Legal Foundation, a group dedicated to 
"free enterprise" and the "free enterprise system." WLF MISSION, http://www.wlf.org/org/mission.asp 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
156. Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escape Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment in the 
Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 202 (2008). 
157. For a description of this book, see supra text accompanying notes 99-104. 
158. Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 118-19 (2004). Note this is 
in striking contrast to the practice of Abraham Lincoln, who did not shy away from representing Rail-
road Companies-the preeminent example of corporate power in his time. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 14-18. 
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have grown from 4 to 150.159 Fewer and fewer lawyers are representing 
individuals.160 The question then arises of how the idea of professional 
identity as advocacy plays out, if at all, in this increasingly important-
albeit largely hidden-context. The answer lies in the prestige accorded 
this bar and the commonalities of the clients they represent. 
1. The "Elite" as Professional Identity 
The stratification of the profession, with the "Wall Street lawyer" at 
the top, has been developing for well over a century. As one legal historian 
has noted, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, "[m]ost lawyers still 
went to court; but the Wall Street lawyer, who perhaps never spoke to a 
judge except socially, made more money and had more prestige than any 
courtroom lawyer could hope fOr.,,161 The career of one prominent law-
yer-Thomas L. Chadbourne-typifies the increasing emergence of the 
Wall Street lawyer. In 1896, Chadbourne's practice included criminal and 
personal injury cases until, as he put it, "[i]t finally dawned on me that with 
the same thought and energy, we could make much more money by chang-
ing our practice and making it more corporate and commercial and less 
trial and criminal."162 After this realization, he only practiced corporate 
law, and the law firm he created-Chadbourne and Parke-remains a ma-
jor law firm serving corporate clients.163 
This stratification is extraordinarily important-probably the single 
most important distinction in the profession today.164 Unlike Chad-
bourne's candid descriptions of the reasons for the shift in his practice, the 
current rhetoric of the large firm is very different. It stresses the greater 
significance and intellectual challenges of representing large organizations; 
the crucial importance of graduating from an elite law school (and thus 
being "the best and the brightest")165 in order to gain entree into large 
159. THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 2007, at A1-A6 (2007). 
160. John P. Heinz, et a\., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 29 (2005) 
(collecting data demonstrating that 64% of lawyers deliver legal services to large organizations-a per-
centage that has grown significantly over time). 
161. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 483 (3d ed. 2005). See also JER-
OLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 63-64 
(1975) (tracing the rise of affluent, largely "corporate" lawyers from the late nineteenth-century to the 
early twentieth-century). 
162. Ariens, supra note 10, at 1016-17 (quoting THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L. CHAD-
BOURNE 34 (Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L. Shivers, eds. 1985)). 
163. [d. 
164. Two commentators have noted as follows: "[M]uch of the differentiation within the legal 
profession is secondary to one fundamental distinction-the distinction between lawyers who represent 
large organizations (corporations, labor unions, or government), and those who represent individuals." 
JOHN P. HEINZ AND EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
BAR 319 (1982). 
165. Even Karl Llewellyn, in his article about the specialization of the bar discussed infra, asserts 
that corporate practice attracts the "best brains"-a demonstration of the intellectual hierarchy just as 
prevalent in 1933 as it is today. See Llewellyn, supra note 38, at 178-79. Compare, however, the just-
quoted statement of Thomas L. Chadbourne, Who noted that business law took "the same thought and 
energy" as trial work-perhaps a candid statement made more possible given how close it was to the 
ascendency of the elite business lawyer. See supra text accompanying note 162. 
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firms; the supposed "complexity" of corporate work that requires the ser-
vices of the "best and the brightest"; equating the large amount of money 
at stake in large firm practice with social importance.166 Each of these as-
sertions is highly questionable,167 but remains the "objective" measure of 
the prestige accorded to lawyers who practice in this area. 
With few exceptions noted below, however, professional identity as 
advocacy does not operate in this context. The most obvious reason why 
this is the case is that in classic large business litigation, one large organiza-
tional client, represented by a large law firm, is opposed to another large 
organizational client, represented by another large law firm. For sure, 
within individual cases there are narratives of right and wrong and morality 
and immorality, of one side doing "the right thing" and the other side do-
ing "the wrong thing."168 Larger political and moral stances-professional 
identity as advocacy-do not come into play, however, because there are 
not opposing categories of clients, such as individual personal injury plain-
tiffs against large organizations or prosecutors against criminal defendants. 
Put another away, the professional identity of opposing law firms in large 
firm practice is identical: they work on behalf of large organizations. There 
is no differential in power or in justice on behalf of one versus another. 
Moreover, while there is a robust sense of gossip among lawyers or law 
students who are in or bound for this type of practice,169 the last thing large 
firms want is to draw attention to themselves outside this bounded circle. 
To do so would be to raise issues of the social and economic impact of their 
own practice on business-the issue that is so essential to the accusations 
against the personal injury bar.170 This is, perhaps, ironic given that an 
increasing number of large firms generate profits in excess of $1 billion,171 
with questions about social value and additional costs to consumers war-
ranting at least some examination. Thus, in the case of large firms, profes-
sional identity as advocacy is studiously avoided, not embraced, and it 
appears that large firms have largely succeeded in achieving this goaUn 
166. Note the following statement in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct relating to 
competence: "The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake: major 
litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser 
complexity and consequence." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUIT R. 1.1 cmt. [5]. This is a remarka-
ble statement, with the circular reasoning that "complex transactions" are "complex"-reasoning that, 
by implication, the more intelligent members of the bar, that is, graduates of elite law schools and 
lawyers in large firms that hire them, are needed to competently represent clients in such matters. 
167. For a detailed discussion of these assertions and what underlie them, see Rubinson, supra 
note 142, at 122-28. 
168. This "moral" element is not only element of advocacy, but of adjudication itself. See Rubin-
son, supra note 142, at 127 (describing litigation as embodying a "morality tale"). 
169. A blog called "biglaw" is one example of this type of internal conversation. ABOVE THE LAW, 
http://abovethelaw.comlbiglaw/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 90--111. 
171. The Am Law 100 20lO-Gross Revenue: Baker &McKenzie Tops Skadden, AMERICAN LAW. 
YER.COM, http://www.law.comljsp/tal!PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202448484841 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
The two largest firms-Baker & McKenzie and Skadden-had profits in excess of $2 billion in 2009. 
172. Horton, supra note 156, at 151 (arguing that "corporate lawyers" successful and "covertly" 
limited the impact of legislation on their practice after the Enron scandal). 
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2. A Scandal Every Now and Then 
To say that large firms remain below the radar screen, however, is 
something of a simplification. The profile of large firms does arise during 
highly publicized corporate fraud cases. One notable example involved 
Charles Keating and the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal. As a result of 
the Keating scandal, the large law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & 
Handler was charged by the Office of Thrift Supervision with wrongdoing 
in its representation of Keating and Keating's bank.I73 The Enron scandal 
was the preeminent event in recent years involving allegations of wrongdo-
ing by large firm lawyers, and Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2001 in the wake of the scandal.I74 
In both of these instances and others, given the enormity of the fraud 
and its economic consequences, there were publicly aired issues of "where 
were the lawyers" along with "where were the accountants" and "where 
were the ratings agencies."175 Time passes, however. For example, once 
the smoke cleared and public interest waned regarding the Enron debacle, 
the fundamental question to be answered was whether law firms should be 
obligated to report wrongdoing on the part of their clients to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. The debate focused on the regulations that 
implemented Sarbanes-Oxley-a technical process that garnered minimal 
public attention. In the end, these regulations, after extensive lobbying by 
the corporate bar, provided for discretionary-not obligatory-report-
ing,176 with some arguing that lawyers who represent organizations got 
favorable treatment under the ActI77 because of their economic power. 
It is telling that these instances demonstrate how episodic the focus is 
on large corporate firms. A spectacular, large-scale fraud will emerge; 
some debate about the role of lawyers in facilitating the fraud will take 
place; and, then, with the passage of time, attention recedes until the next 
large-scale fraud will come to light. I78 These episodes retain none of the 
durability and consistency that is the hallmark of professional identity as 
advocacy. Large firms can deploy the substantial resources available to 
them collectively to influence legislation once the initial wave of public and 
173. The Keating affair generated a large scholarly response. For two particularly balanced treat-
ments of the scandal, see Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office 
of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (1993); William H. Simon, 
The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and 
Apology, 33 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 259-67, 277 (1998). The matter was settled with Kaye Scholer 
paying forty-one million dollars. Curtis, supra, at 1000. 
174. 15 U.S.c. § 7245 (2006). 
175. Marianne C. Adams, Breaking Past the Parallax: Finding the True Place of Lawyers in Securi-
ties Fraud, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 975 (2010) (the "question on everyone's lips after Enron, and 
really after many corporate or securities scandals, [is I 'where were the lawyers?' "). 
176. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2011). 
177. Horton, supra note 156. Horton argues that the political influence of "corporate lawyers"-
influence that operates below the radar screen of public scrutiny-led to favorable treatment under 
Sarbanes-Oxley in contrast to "corporate officers and accountants," both of which "made easier legisla-
tive targets." [d. at 202. 
178. [d. 
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legislative indignation has worn Off.179 In Llewellyn's terms there is no 
"counter-specialization"180 because all large firms have similar clients and 
thereby have a collective interest in operating below the radar screen. 
VI. THE IMPOSSIBILITY AND INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE 
Two crucial questions remain regarding professional identity as advo-
cacy. Is this dynamic good or bad? If bad, can it change? 
What little attention has been focused on this general process tends to 
view it as undermining the integrity of the profession and the rational con-
sideration of the policy and legal issues that are raised. For example, one 
scholar argues that the "language of fault" among opposing groups of law-
yers generates suspicion and, ultimately, a refusal to legitimate the perspec-
tives of their opponents.18l His solution is a call for an "alternative 
discourse. "182 Another commentator decries how each side in the tort re-
form debate seeks to "transform reality" to its advantage, and calls for a 
more subtle, less strident debate that could generate a more "multi-dimen-
sional" discourse.183 Given the pervasiveness of the debate described in 
this Article, it is, perhaps, surprising that these calls are relatively rare. 
Most attention is focused on "civility" or declining "professionalism,"184 
but these debates almost always focus on interactions between individual 
lawyers in litigation, not on aggregations of opposing groups of lawyers 
representing clients with consistently divergent interests. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to disagree with the relatively few who do criti-
cize professional identity as discourse. For sure, these debates raise crucial 
issues. The personal injury debate raises important questions: the impact 
of damage awards on the cost of medical care; the role of personal injury 
attorneys as private attorneys general; access to justice at least in personal 
injury cases for clients who otherwise cannot afford representation. These 
are matters worth discussing. Accusing professional groups of greedy self-
interest while subverting truth and justice, however, hardly seems a produc-
tive means to foster constructive debate about public policy. 
An even greater and less obvious impact of professional identity as 
advocacy is its tendency to surface only some issues of public policy while 
masking others. For example, the impact of personal injury damages on 
businesses is certainly worth talking about. So is the impact of billions of 
dollars of attorneys' fees incurred by businesses in retaining corporate law-
yers in litigation against other businesses. It is, however, only the first that 
179. See Horton, supra note 156, at 169-76 (discussing the quiet lobbying lawyer employed to 
amend Sarbanes-Oxiey to their advantage). 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
181. Burke, supra note 120, at 2131-37. 
182. ld. at 2131. 
183. Greenlee, supra note 106, at 734, 737. 
184. One trend in this regard is the proliferation of "civility codes." Brenda Smith, Civility Codes: 
The Newest Weapons in the "Civil" War over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 151. 152 (1998). 
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generates scrutiny. Moreover, the tragedy of huge numbers of unrepre-
sented litigants in matters which, by any measure, place fundamental 
human needs-food, shelter, custody of children-at risk remains largely 
invisible. There are few lawyers to "fight for your rights" in these cases, 
and the few there are do not have the economic wherewithal to bring the 
plight of their clients into the realm of popular or legislative discourse. 
So what to do? One can call for a brighter, less professionally charged 
future with hopes of a unified and serene professional brotherhood and 
sisterhood and a more equitable vision of legal needs and issues. As a mat-
ter of conscious agency, of willed change, this is hard to imagine. This is not 
a failure of imagination itself but a reflection of the limits of change in the 
face of entrenched ways, supported by economic inequalities, of thinking 
and doing.185 At the same time, there are trends in the profession which 
suggest that change is not only possible, but that it is inevitable. This has to 
do with shifting conceptions of what the practice of law is-a shift towards 
a greater focus on problem-solving and "holistic" advocacy. This Article 
concludes by exploring these contradictory trends: 
A. The Impossibility of Change 
On one level, professional identity as advocacy is impervious to 
change.186 Unlike a stalemate in chess, however, this does not signal the 
end of the game but only a recipe for the war to continue unabated into the 
foreseeable future. 
In personal injury, substantial economic resources available to the 
conflicting groups will likely generate continuing political battles on "tort 
reform."187 Even the occasional "compromise" will only be a jumping-off 
point for further identity advocacy or, alternatively, will only have minimal 
impact. 
In the area of criminal law, the constitutional structure underpinning 
advocacy and the political impetus towards criminalization generates a du-
rable structure with little chance for change. This is especially true given 
the "good" versus "evil" narrative inherent in criminal cases,188 which 
lends itself to professional identity wars whatever the disproportionate re-
sources available to prosecutors. And the stock figure of the politically 
ambitious prosecutor and the defense attorney seeking to "get off" 
185. The numbers of strategies of "heuristics" that contribute to this tendency are legion. To take 
one example, there is the idea called "confirmation bias," "biased fact assimilation," or "anchoring" 
through which humans view the world as confirming judgments already arrived at. See, e.g., MAX H. 
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 54 (1992) ("people are more likely 
to take at face value information they agree with and scrutinize more carefully information they 
don't"). 
186. A good example is the idea of "caps" on contingent fees based on how far along a case gets, 
with higher fees being earned if a case goes to trial. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL 
ETHICS 840 (5th ed. 2009). Even such "compromise" measures are further compromised when clients 
can waive such caps, which is how some jurisdictions handle these caps. ld. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 121, 138-40. 
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criminals "on technicalities"189 remain deeply embedded in American cul-
ture and not likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
B. The Inevitability of Change 
On the other hand, the conception of the legal professional appears to 
be shifting. These changes will not affect the identity wars per se, but, in-
terestingly, shift the meaning of professional identity itself. 
In recent years there have been increasing calls for a new sense of 
lawyers as managers of conflict, not as purveyors or intensifiers of con-
flict. 190 These calls have appeared in an interlocking set of ideas and prac-
tices. One is mediation, with its focus on a collaborative vision of conflict 
resolution that eschews the "zealous advocacy" of the prevailing profes-
sional and cultural norms of lawyering.191 It is notable that despite media-
tion's heretofore "new age" reputation,l92 mediation is not only practiced 
in virtually all areas of the law, but it is specifically practiced in the context 
of personal injury193 and criminallaw.194 Another is "problem-solving ne-
gotiation" with its emphasis on transparency and collaboration rather on 
conventional strategies of negotiation.195 Yet another is "collaborative 
lawyering," which promotes collaboration with lawyers who explicitly de-
cline to represent their clients should the matter wind up in litigation. 196 
While usually associated with family law, collaborative law is spreading to 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 138-4l. 
190. A good general overview of this shifting conception is Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer 
as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 
72 TEMPLE L. REV. 785 (1999). 
191. The literature on mediation is vast. For particular treatments of the impact that the media-
tion boom will have on how lawyers represent clients, see Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns 
Peacemaker: With Mediation Emerging as the Most Popular Form of Dispute Resolution, the Quest for 
Common Ground Could Force Attorneys to Reinterpret Everything They Do in the Future, 82 A.B.A. J. 
54 (1996); Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challeng-
ing the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995) 
(describing empirical data demonstrating the positive impact attorneys can have in facilitating the medi-
ation process); Jean Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and 
Psychology To Structure Advocacy, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269 (1999). 
192. Judith Meyer, Mediators' Alert: Now, Certification Goes Global, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH 
COST LITIGATION 67 (2008) (referring to how mediation was often viewed as a "new-age wild idea" and 
is now "an accepted, institutionally embraced alternative to litigation"). 
193. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 54-55 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the 
successful mediation of a personal injury claim). 
194. Criminal law mediation is usually called "victim-offender mediation." See Catherine Pugh, 
What Do You Get When You Add Megan Williams to Matthew Shepard and Victim-Offender Media-
tion? A Hate Crime Law that Prosecutors Will Actually Want to Use, 45 CAL. w. L. REv. 179 (2008); 
Nancy Lucas, Resticurion, Rehabilication, Prevention, and Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediation 
for First-Time Non-Violent Yourhful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365 (2001). There is also a Vic-
tim Offender Mediation Association. VI=IM OFFENDER MEDIATION ASSOCIATION, http:// 
www.voma.org! (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). 
195. An enormously influential text on this strategy is WILLIAM L. URY, ROGER FISHER, & 
BRUCE M. PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1992). 
196. For an overview of the collaborative law process, see William H. Schwab, Collaborative 
Lawering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351 (2004). 
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different areas, including medical malpractice.197 Another trend is charac-
terized as "holistic lawyering" which has taken root particularly in criminal 
law cases.198 Holistic lawyering strives to, as one well-known criminal de-
fense public defender organization characterizes it, "view[] clients not as 
'cases,' but as whole people" with a commitment "to working with our cli-
ents, their families, and their communities to address the critical issues that 
circumscribe their lives. "199 
These trends are not the dreams of academics: each, as the preceding 
citations demonstrate, are in the "real world." They may also become 
more common and normalized as new generations of lawyers are educated 
and begin to practice, advertise, and teach. If so, professional identity as 
advocacy may recede, or at least become less strident, because notions of 
"advocacy" itself will shift into a more collaborative mode. This shift is far 
from inevitable, however, but the reality of the trends I have described "on 
the ground" suggest that it is a very real possibility. 
C. And What of Organizational and Low-Income Representation? 
As I have described,20o the "masking" impact of professional identity 
as advocacy is the most subtle and insidious of all its consequences. The 
foundation of such masking runs deep, seemingly arising from the depths 
of economic disparities and the inevitable impact that these resources have 
on what gets noticed and what does not. 
Even so, there are glimmers of change even here as well. The econom-
ics of large firms have changed given recent economic turbulence, although 
whether this will lead to enduring structural change or the dissolution of 
the "big firm" model remains to be seen?Ol The entrenched economic dis-
parities in low-income representation remain seemingly impervious to 
change, but even here new models of "community lawyering," with a focus 
on attorney collaboration with communities and economic development 
agencies in a non-litigation context, might modify the current model of in-
dividual and "impact" litigation.202 In addition, although the scandal of the 
inequities of access to justice remains, there continue to be calls for some-
thing to be done, even among professional organizations and an attempt at 
the expansion of pro bono by all lawyers.203 Any hope for positive 
197. Kathleen Clark, The Use of Collaborative Law in Medical Error Situations, 19 No.6 HEALTH 
L. 19 (2007). 
198. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and 
Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067 (2004). 
199. Bronx Defenders, BRIDGE BUILDERS, http://www.bridgebuilderscpi.orglcontentlbronx-de-
fenders (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 142, 180. 
201. For a provocative and recent examination of what the author calls "the death of big law," see 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749 (2010). 
202. For a general description of "community lawerying," see Scott L. Cummings, Community 
Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001). 
203. For perhaps the most comprehensive recent overview of access to justice, including a critique 
of the legal profession's response to it, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
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trends in access must be especially guarded, however, as I have argued 
elsewhere.204 
The impossibility/inevitability of change conundrum thus applies in 
these two special contexts as well, although it would be a great leap of faith 
indeed to hold that change will gain the upper hand. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Professional identity as advocacy collapses the space between attorney 
and client. The lawyer who specializes in representing one type of client 
assumes the mangle of what is good, while, inevitably, in this specialist's 
story, the counter-specialist is bad. The counter-specialist, in contrast, tells 
a story that switches the roles of "good guy" and "bad guy." This creates a 
fight for moral superiority. And yet the very public and strident nature of 
the professional-identity debate hides other areas of the profession that 
have substantial economic and social consequences. Professional identity 
as advocacy renders both certain types of practice particularly salient while 
rendering other types of practice invisible. 
The mechanisms that create this process-specialization generating 
counter-specialization205 and the morality tale these competing specialists 
deploy against one another206-are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the changing profession itself, without any "willed" 
change on the part of individual attorneys or the profession as a whole, will 
gradually neutralize these dynamics. As the coming years and decades un-
fold and as more collaborative models of what it means to be a lawyer take 
hold, it is possible that the premises underlying professional identity as ad-
vocacy will recede. Attorneys who embrace these new models might serve 
clients more effectively, and, bit by bit, the engine that generates profes-
sional identity will stop running. But even if this happens, low-income liti-
gants who cannot afford lawyers appear, in large part, to be left out. It is 
this invisible group-those who do not have lawyers either appointed for 
them or willing to represent them because it is not economically viable to 
do so-who need the most attention. Perhaps, in the end, some of the 
efforts directed at opposing professional groups can be redirected to rem-
edy the one place where lawyers do not go and where advocacy of any sort 
is most needed. 
204. Rubinson, supra note 142. 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 43-65. 
